In a letter to Hay before Marshall issued his opinion and the subpoena, Jefferson responded to the request by Burr with his belief that “reserving the necessary right of the President of the U S to decide, independently of all other authority, what papers, coming to him as President, the public interests permit to be communicated, & to whom, I assure you of my readiness under that restriction, voluntarily to furnish on all occasions, whatever the purposes of justice may require.”  After hearing of the subpoena, Jefferson exploded, arguing “the leading principal of our Constitution is the independence of  the Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other… but would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience…?”  In a draft, Jefferson is even more explicit in his anger towards Marshall for having the nerve to “convert [the] Trial into a contest between the judiciary & Exve Authorities… and take the first step to bring it on.”  In all of these letters, Jefferson conceded that he would and had sent the information, but would never subject himself, as President, to appear in person. This confrontation, akin to the more substantial Marbury v. Madison decision, is one of the foundational episodes that determined how the judicial and executive branches would interact and exert their respective authority. Marshall did not press Jefferson to attend, but asserted a measure of the judicial branch’s authority in requiring evidence to be turned over to the court, whereas Jefferson clearly defined the limitations of direct oversight between co-equal branches. 
	Following the indictment of Burr, the case moved to the true trial and opened in early August. After the opening statements and several rounds of testimony, on August 21st, the defense made a motion to suppress the evidence given by the prosecution on the grounds that it constituted constructive treason, not treason as defined by the constitution. Edmund Randolph, an attorney for Burr, stated four questions regarding the line of reasoning taken by the prosecution:  
First. Whether there can be treason in levying war without the employment of force. Secondly. Whether, under the constitution… a person, who it is admitted would be an accessory in felony, can be considered as a principal in treason in levying war. Thirdly. Whether, under the form of this indictment, charging colonel Burr with having done the act personally, any evidence of a derivative or accessorial agency can be admitted. Fourthly. And if such evidence of a derivative or accessorial treason were to be admitted, under this indictment, whether the real principal ought not to be first convicted. 

This argument called upon the specific definition of treason as written in the U.S. Constitution, which states “Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.”