This is also the line of argument that he implements to account for disagreement; the best explanation for disagreement would be that there are no objective moral values, they are instead relative to ones culture. Due to this line of thought for any consistency to be established it must then follow that for culture to be an appropriate cause of morality there must also not be any disagreement within each group.
	Mackie believes to have solved this issue as well, accounting for the possible disagreement within groups through what he calls moral heretics or reformers.  The idea here is that disagreement involved with these reformers is simply about non-moral facts and is an extension of their more faithful adherence to the codes relatively derived form their culture. Mackie uses the word “consistency”, stating that the disagreement established by the reformer’s stricter observance of the codes is required for the consistency he or she seeks within the rules the culture has developed.  The disagreement, in accordance with this account, is then derived from differences in application of morality and not morality itself; it is in the realm of non-moral fact.
	I believe that this account of moral reformers and heretics is unsatisfactory in that it only takes into account a specific moral reformer. Moral disagreement can be established within specific groups if one looks past this singular example of reformation.  I would like to bring up a contemporary example, a type of moral disagreement in this culture, the reformer pushing for gay rights and more specifically marriage.  The argument against gay marriage is usually one from a standpoint of religion where they state that a union between two men or two women is morally wrong. It is clear then that this is a moral disagreement and not an argument about the definition of marriage or any other non-moral fact, here the disagreement is about the moral value associated with being gay.  Mackie would most likely respond by trying to claim that these are two separate relative groups each with there own moral codes which would make this type of disagreement the one he has already accounted for in his original argument.  My response would be to claim that his definition of group, or way of life, is too vague and if he were willing to make this separation within a single nation where would the final line be drawn?  Could we go as far as to claim that morals are specifically relative to ones immediate family?  I think not.  In fact I argue that if he were to allow this to be the case his original argument would be drastically different and would not account for the disagreement he used to refute objective moral value.  It would instead have to encompass all kinds of disagreement because it would attempt to turn all moral disagreement into non-moral fact by becoming more specific with its definition of group or way of life. 