In its most extreme application, I believe this would even include disagreement within the self. As a whole this line of reasoning does not service his claim that there are no objective moral values and in fact leads to a more difficult assertion about disagreement in general.
	The possibility of disagreement within reformers is also not taken into account by this claim and obviously if we can find moral disagreement within the reformers it would be considered the same type of moral disagreement Mackie refutes outside the category.  I introduce the concept of violence versus non-violence; different reformers both embrace and condemn the use of violence as a means to their reformation.  Mackie would call this another case of non-moral fact and I would agree with him if this distinction only represented itself, however it does not.  Beyond its affect on the actions of the reformers, this distinction represents an underlying disagreement in the morals of the reformers.  It represents their conception of the morality of violence, and whether or not it is morally acceptable to implement violence in order to achieve their goals.  Therefore it is not within the realm of non-moral fact but rather is the type of disagreement we require and because we can ascertain moral disagreement regardless of its relation to a sub-category we can again conclude that, based on Mackie’s original line of reasoning, morals can not be derived relatively from culture.  As I had him argue in this case, I believe Mackie would attempt to categorize all disagreement within the reformers as disagreement in non-moral fact. As he defines it would only be disagreement in how they bring about their reformation and not on the basic moral level.  What Mackie doesn’t consider is that disagreement in non-moral fact does not rule disagreement in moral fact.  In fact a disagreement in non-moral fact could certainly stem from an inference developed from a deeper disagreement the two hold about a moral fact.  And if we follow his original line of reasoning, inference to the best explanation, this would be the best answer based in the fact that disagreement qualifies the underlying premise as false. 
	Next I would like to examine the case of the moral heretic as I do not believe Mackie accounts for this instance of disagreement in his examination of moral reformers, even though he does mention the concept.  He defines moral heretics and reformers as, “…people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons we would endorse.” I highlight the end of the phrase to draw attention to the conflict between this definition and the moral heretic.  He casually lumps the heretic in with the reformer almost as if dismissing or overlooking the concept entirely.  It is not the case that a moral heretic would have any endorsement from his culture because he does not hold conventional beliefs. 