 This quotation relates to Aristotle’s idea that a person must not only have knowledge of good and evil; he must express it in his actions to be virtuous. In addition, a simple virtuous act does not make a man virtuous; it is through repeated, habitual action that a man learns virtue.
One of the questions I have regarding Aristotle’s concept of virtue is whether his definition can be extended to creatures that are not human. (This was also discussed in Plato’s Laches, where Socrates generally believes that virtue cannot extend to animals.) His argument seems to imply that habitual action must be rational action in order to form virtue. From this, it follows that animals that we normally ascribe virtues to, such as lions, cannot possess virtues such as courage because they are incapable of carrying out rational thought, which Aristotle claims is the unique function of humans.
There are numerous examples from life that support Aristotle’s claim. The function of an orator is to speak. No man is born with oratory skills; he must learn them through practice—not just speaking anything, but by speaking the right things. Similarly, artists must practice not just splashing paint on a canvas, but giving the paint order and composition. If the function of a man, then, is to be rational, a good man will learn to reason well—what we call virtue. However, there is one objection: do not some functions arise intrinsically and irrationally and not from reason? The dancer may be predisposed to have better grace and skill from the genetic structure of his feet and his body. Likewise, is there not a part of virtue that is intrinsic to us, that is unlearned? A mother may be virtuous when she instinctually protects her child without rational thought—it is innate.
In this excerpt from John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, he argues that ethically correct actions are those that have the greatest utility, that is, moral actions are those that cause the greatest pleasure and the least pain. When looking at an action’s utility, we must look at its consequences on all those involved—namely, society as a whole. However, this does not mean that we must go through the stringent moral calculus of determining an action’s utility to society; Mill argues that secondary principles, such as “do not murder” are paths to utility. Neither should we discount the action’s effect on individual happiness; the happiness of the many individuals leads to the happiness of society as a whole.
A key quotation from this passage is: “…actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” Thus, the consequences of the actions are most important (in contrast to Kantian ethics, where the intent of the action determines if it is virtuous). Mill argues that the pursuit of pleasure is not a hedonistic ideal, but a noble one, for human pleasures, such as intellectual activity, are of a greater quality than animal pleasures.
