For the sake of brevity, we will assume the existence of such a god or gods, since such an assumption was presupposed by the majority of the philosophers that we have studied so far in this course. To make such a presupposition is not a leap in the logic of the subject at hand, since we are not discussing what morality is, but rather why one ought to be moral, a question that is irrelevant, or at least trivial, if morality is subjective.
	In A. J. Ayer’s “Emotivism Affirmed,” he asserts that “ethical judgments have no validity,” a concept that he spends the majority of the passage defending and explaining. But much more importantly, he concludes with the statement: “One of the chief causes of moral behavior is fear, both conscious and unconscious, of a god’s displeasure, and fear of the enmity of society.” In this statement, Ayer echoes the conclusion of a story Socrates told Glaucon of a magic ring that made it’s finder, Gyges, invisible at will, allowing him to do all sorts of unjust things for his own gain, with no repercussions. Socrates then asks which man would be happier, a man who lives immorally with no negative consequences, or a man who lives justly with no positive consequences. The two conclude that the former would be happier, and that it is the perception of morality, not morality itself that ought to be desired.
	However, I contend that such a lifestyle would be unrewarding and unfulfilling. The aforementioned hypothetical scenario includes the unjust man bringing offerings to the gods, to win their favor. The basic argument here is that all morality is in fact selfishness in disguise, and that if morality pleases the gods, then we need only to appear moral, thus escaping any eternal ramifications of immorality. But this argument is indefensible, for such a presumption ignores the very factor by which the presumed gods know of a man’s morality in the first place: omniscience. It is most commonly suggested that morality is not limited only to actions, but encompasses thoughts as well. Let us assume then that the god in question judges all moral actions, including one’s thoughts (as is taught by most major religions: Islam- Surat at-Taghabun, 64:4, Christianity- 1 John 3:20). Such a god would be aware of any selfishness motivating apparent morality, thereby exposing it as in fact immoral.
	The argument made by Socrates does not necessitate the gods being unaware, only restricted in their ability to punish. I contend that the desire to please a creator in such a situation is the only sincere motivation behind morality. Selflessness towards others always brings with it a reward, even if only warm fuzzies. But just as I chose my father’s desires over my own in enrolling for school, moral men choose a path of morality out of honor to a creator, rather than with selfish expectations. 