 Those two amendments would be the most crucial in preventing lack of maintenance by homeowners, but as a last resort for extreme circumstances, the preservation Commission or the Department of Inspections should be given the power to seek judicial enforcement against any homeowner found to be demolishing their home through neglect.  If these amendments were passed by the Metro Counsel, then the Preservation Commission and the Department of Inspections would have a lot more power to take preemptive action against demolition by neglect. Of course we could not rely on the government alone to prevent this problem, much of what underlines the issue is economic difficulties and public perception that Preservation groups only seek to hinder development. For this problem to be fully confronted, the government along with Preservation groups should work together to make funds available for homeowners who are legitimately having difficulty in maintaining the integrity of their historical property. This system of government enforcement with outside organizations working with and providing resources for the average homeowner, and penalizing those who are purposefully trying to circumvent the law, will not only avoid costly and embarrassing court battles, but will better ensure that the cultural and historical properties that define Louisville will be preserved for future generations of citizens.


	I dissent from the majority’s holding that a rational-basis review of Congress’ decision to regulate a “class of activities” that includes local, non-commercial behavior is proper, as long as the regulation is part of a “general regulatory statute [that] bears a substantial relation to commerce,” while also refusing to hear as-applied challenges that would “excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme,” which effectively abolishes any meaningful limitations on Congress’ power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Instead, I would have held the CSA unconstitutional as applied to respondent Monson who cultivated and consumed medical marijuana which never entered the stream of commerce, is not a regulation that is rationally related to Congress’ Commerce Clause power, while remanding the question of the constitutionality of regulating Raich’s medical marijuana use, in accordance with the stricter scrutiny test described in this opinion.  

The respondents have argued that application of the CSA to their “intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as recommended by a patient's physician pursuant to valid California state law” is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. I agree with Justice Scalia in his concurrence, that a necessary and proper clause analysis is necessary because the respondents are challenging the authority of Congress’ implied power to regulate this class of activities, but disagree with his conclusion that regulations of respondent’s activities were “appropriate means of achieving the legitimate end of eradicating Schedule I substances from interstate commerce.” 

In conducting the necessary and proper clause analysis, I think it is necessary to differentiate between the respondents, since Raich obtained her marijuana from a third-party, while Monson’s production and consumption was entirely personal. 